TRANSFORMATION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY INSTITUTION IN KAZAKHSTAN IN THE CONTEXT OF POLITICAL REFORMS

Abstract

This article analyzes institutional changes in Kazakhstan’s system of parliamentarism in the context of political reforms. The study aims to assess the effectiveness of the transition from a super-presidential model of governance to a more balanced system through the lenses of neo-institutionalism and structural-functional analysis.

The findings demonstrate that, despite reforms aimed at deconstructing the power vertical and introducing a mixed electoral system, institutional inertia persists, characterizing the current arrangement as a hybrid model.

Particular attention is paid to the growing legislative agency of deputies, as evidenced by the example of the law on asset recovery. The article argues that the 2025 initiatives focused on a shift to a unicameral parliament and the strengthening of budgetary oversight constitute the final stage of abandoning the transitional model.

It is concluded that successful political modernization and overcoming institutional inertia are possible only with the formation of a strong unicameral Parliament based on a developed multiparty system and possessing real mechanisms for controlling the executive branch.